Introduction
In [CL01] two biases in the LEVIATHAN function that distinguished it from a random function were presented. The PRF-PRF attack shows that the probability of a collision in 64 bit output words is doubled compared to a random function. The s-box matching attack exploits a weekness in the key-dependent s-box of LEVIATHAN. This weekness causes, that a specific xor pattern of two successive LEVIATHAN output words is twice as likely as the same pattern for a random function.
The authors of [CL01] demonstrated both biases with experiments on a reduced version of the stream cipher.
Experiments
We have implemented the s-box matching attack for the full version of LEVIATHAN. We can expect the specific output pattern of two successive output words with probability 2 −31 . For 2 n generated key stream words we get therefore 2 n−31 specific patterns in average. 
Conclusion
The s-box matching distinguisher works very fine even for the full version of LEVIATHAN. Although this bias reveals a serious statistical weekness, we have not found a way to exploit this property in order to get information about the used secret key.
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